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Abstract
When two candidates of dierent quality compete in a one dimensional policy space,
the equilibrium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median. There
are three main eects. First, the better candidate adopts more centrist policies than the
worse candidate. Second, the equilibrium is statistical, in the sense that it predicts a
probability distribution of outcomes rather than a single degenerate outcome. Third, the
equilibrium varies systematically with the level of uncertainty about the location of the
median voter. We test these three predictions using laboratory experiments, and nd
strong support for all three. We also observe some biases and show that they can be
explained by quantal response equilibrium.
JEL classication numbers: C72, C92, D72
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The Eect of Candidate Quality on Electoral
Equilibrium: An Experimental Study

Enriqueta Aragones Thomas R. Palfrey
1 Introduction
Candidate quality is widely considered to be a critical variable in electoral competition.
1
It aects the decisions of politicians to run for oÆce, campaign fundraising and adver-
tising, voter behavior, election outcomes, and, ultimately, policy outcomes. While direct
measurement of candidate quality is often elusive, few doubt its importance in electoral
politics. Quality dierences between two candidates can arise for many reasons, in-
cluding charisma, oÆce-holding experience, incumbency, advertising, scandal, and other
non-policy dimensions that can aect the relative attractiveness of two candidates. Po-
litical scientists have demonstrated over several decades of careful empirical research the
importance of these and other image factors, or the \valence dimension," as it is referred
to in numerous articles and books.
2
It is obvious that, all else constant, high quality candidates will fare better than
low quality candidates. What is less obvious, but equally important, is that quality
dierences produce signicant changes in the nature of political competition. Recent
papers by Ansolobehere and Snyder (2000), Aragones and Palfrey (2002), and Groseclose
(2001) report a number of theoretical results about the equilibrium properties of spatial
competition between two candidates who dier in quality.
3
The results are striking,

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For example, most studies of the incumbency advantage in congressional elections identify challenger
quality as a critical factor. See Bond, Covington, and Fleischer (1985), Green and Krasno (1988),
Jacobson and Kernell (1981), Krasno (1994), Squire (1992), Maisel, Stone and Maestas (1999), and the
references they cite. Incumbency itself can also be viewed as an indicator of quality.
2
See, for example, Stokes (1963), Kiewiet (1983), Banks and Kiewiet (1989), Kiewiet and Zheng
(1993), Popkin (1976), and the references they cite.
3
There are also some earlier theoretical papers that studied related kinds of asymmetry, such as
incumbency or partisanship. These include Adams (1998), Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985), and
Londregan and Romer (1993).
and suggest that the indirect equilibrium eects of candidate quality dierentials may be
even more important in determining candidate policies and election outcomes outcomes
than the direct eects of producing more votes for one candidate than the other.
4
The main insight about spatial competition if the candidates dier in quality (or
along some other valence dimension) is that the better candidate has an incentive to copy
the policies of the inferior candidate, or at least move in that direction, while the disad-
vantaged candidate has the opposite incentive, to distance himself from the advantaged
candidate. Theoretically, the advantaged candidate will win all the votes if the two can-
didates choose suÆciently similar policies. Thus, in the standard Downsian model where
candidates are purley oÆce-motivated, the disadvantaged candidate must mix in order
not to be predictable. However, in order for mixing to be an equilibrium strategy for the
disadvantaged candidate, the advantaged candidate also must be mixing.
5
This implies the rst of three key properties of equilibrium in these models: the
equilibrium makes statistical predictions, not point predictions. If both candidates have
complete information and symmetric beliefs about voters, then the equilibrium is gener-
ally in mixed strategies. If candidates have private information with continuous types,
then this mixed equilibrium can be \puried." That is, there will exist an equilibrium
in pure strategies, where the equilibrium locations of candidates will vary with this pri-
vate information. Moreover, both the pure and mixed strategies produce distributions of
location decisions that share similar statistical properties (Aragones and Palfrey 2001).
The second key property is that the distribution of location decisions of the two can-
didates will be dierent from each other, and the dierences are systematic. We call
this \the quality divergence hypothesis." The main dierence between the two candidate
locations is that the distribution of locations of the better candidate is concentrated in
the center of the policy space (i.e. the expected location of the median voter), while
the location of the disadvantaged candidate tends toward the extremes. That is, better
candidates tend to choose more moderate locations. Groseclose (2001) notes that this is
consistent with two regularities that have been identied in empirical studies of congres-
sional elections. One is the lack of support for the marginality hypothesis, documented in
Fiorina (1973). That is, Fiorina nds that incumbents who are in marginal districts tend
to moderate less than incumbents from safe districts. This is clearly consistent with the
quality divergence hypothesis. Second, there is a recent paper by Ansolobehere, Snyder,
and Stewart (2001) who compare the spatial locations of three categories of candidates:
(1) incumbents seeking re-election; (2) candidates for open seats; and (3) challengers
4
Using a dierent approach, Banks and Kiewiet (1989) show that candidate quality dierentials can
have important and surprising equilibrium eects on the entry of challengers in Congressional elections.
5
An equilibrium in mixed strategies is guaranteed to exist (Aragones and Palfrey, 2002), and has
intuitive properties. A pure strategy equilibrium may exist if candidates obtain utility from winning
policies as well as from holding oÆce, under certain conditions. Groseclose(2001) studies the properties
of stable pure strategy equilibria, under the maintained assumption that they exist, but does characterize
conditions for existence. He presents an example suggesting that existence is especially problematic for
small-to-intermediate values of the quality advantage, and if oÆce holding is the primary motivation of
candidates. The properties of pure strategy equilibria are similar to those of mixed equilibria.
2
running against an incumbent. They nd that incumbents are the most moderate, fol-
lowed by open seat candidates, and that challengers adopt the most extreme positions.
To the extent that quality correlates across these three categories as expected, then this
is consistent with the we think of incumbents from safe districts as being advantaged
due to unbalanced partisanship of the district, then this provides further corroboration
of the quality divergence hypothesis.
The third property is that the two candidates' equilibrium distributions of locations
varies systematically with the degree of uncertainty about the median voter. Uncertainty
helps the disadvantaged candidate and leads to a less centrist location of the advantaged
candidate. On average, reduced uncertainty (or less polarization of the electorate) will
lead to more centrist outcomes. Put another way, the quality divergence eect is strongest
when there is a lot of uncertainty or if the electorate is highly polarized, and the eect is
weakest when there is little uncertainty or a high degree of consensus in the electorate.
We call this \the polarization hypothesis."
Because the nature of equilibrium is very subtle in these asymmetric spatial com-
petition games, and because the equilibrium (with complete information) is mixed, one
cannot help but be skeptical about whether the features of the theoretical equilibrium
might actually occur in practice. While the evidence put forth by Groseclose (1973)
is consistent with the quality divergence hypothesis, that evidence could be explained
by other theories. For example, the correlation between incumbency (i.e. electoral suc-
cess) and moderation is also consistent with the standard Downsian model, or the more
general models by Calvert (1985) and Wittman (1983) that include policy motivations.
Thus, the evidence is suggestive that the theory may be on the right track, but does not
provide a conclusive test of the model. Unfortunately, the kind of eld data one would
need to test these predictions are simply not available, due to the diÆculty of obtaining
reliable and accurate measurement of the \quality" variable, the degree of uncertainty or
polarization in the electorate, and the location of candidates, and because the statistical
nature of predictions would require a large number of observations. We believe that
direct testing of the theory is needed.
With this in mind, we designed and conducted laboratory experiments to directly test
both the quality divergence hypothesis and the polarization hypothesis. By doing so, we
hope to nd out if the basic predictions of the theory are accurate, and, if not, what
sort of modication of the theory might be required. This paper reports and analyzes
the data from those experiments. There are two main ndings. First, all of the main
qualitative properties of the equilibrium were clearly observed in the data. Both the
quality divergency hypothesis and the polarization hypothesis are strongly supported by
the data. Location decisions were statistical; the advantaged candidates located more
centrally on average; and all of the comparative static predictions of changes in the
distribution of voters were observed. In particular, when the distribution of voters was
more polarized, there was more divergence. Second, while the main hypothesis were
clearly supported, the exact distribution of locations was somewhat dierent from the
quantitative predictions of the theory in systematic and surprising ways. There were two
3
interesting dierences. First, both candidates showed a bias toward centrist locations,
relative to the theoretical predictions. Second, the disadvantaged candidate's location
distribution was less responsive to changes in uncertainty than predicted by the theory.
In order to account for these anomalies, we consider an extension of Nash equilib-
rium theory that allows for a limited amount of bounded rationality. This approach,
called Quantal Reponse Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, 1996), is based on two
principles. The rst principle is that players of any game respond continuously, but
imperfectly, to the incentive structure in the game. While they cannot always optimize
perfectly, they will on average choose better strategies more often than worse strate-
gies. The second principle is that players are aware that othe players are also imperfect,
and take this into account in choosing their actions. This boundedly rational version of
Nash equilibrium often leads to surprising and unintuitive predictions about behavior in
games, and provides a statistical model for data analysis.
6
To analyze our data using
this approach, we t the data to the Logit version of Quantal Response Equilibrium. We
nd that the simplest one-parameter version of that model provides an excellent t to
the data, and accounts for the two unexpected ndings.
In section 2 we summarize the results of Aragones and Palfrey (2002) and present the
specic model that we use for the laboratory study and solve for the Nash equilibrium.
In section 3 we describe the details of the experimental design. In section 4, we present
the results of the experiments. In section 5 we describe and estimate the QRE model
using the experimental data. We conclude in section 6.
2 The Model
We begin by describing the model and basic results of Aragones and Palfrey (2002).
The policy space, }, is one-dimensional and consists of the set of n points on the [0; 1]
interval, x
i
=
i 1
n 1
, i = 1; 2; : : : ; n. There are two candidates, A and D, who are referred
to as the advantaged candidate and the disadvantaged candidate, respectively. Each
candidate's objective is to maximize his probability of winning the election. Each voter
has a utility function, with two components, a policy component, and a candidate image
component.
7
The policy component is characterized by an ideal point in the policy
space }, with utility of alternatives in the policy space a strictly decreasing function of
the Euclidean distance between the ideal point and the location of the policy, symmetric
around the ideal point. We assume there exists a unique median location, denoted by x
m
.
Candidates do not know x
m
, but share a common prior belief about it. This commonly
shared belief is represented by a probability distribution over }, and is denoted by a
vector of probabilities, (
1
; : : : ; 
n
), where 
i
 0, i = 1; 2; : : : ; n and 
1
+ : : : + 
n
= 1:
We denote by m the median of the distribution . The image component is captured by
6
For example of applications of Quantal Response Equilibrium approach, see Goeree and Holt (2001),
Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000), and Signorino (1999).
7
There could be either a nite number of voters or a continuum.
4
an additive constant to the utility a voter gets if A wins the election. That is, the utility
that a voter with ideal point x
i
obtains if A wins the election is U
i
(x
A
) = Æ   jx
i
  x
A
j
and his utility if candidate D wins is U
i
(x
D
) =   jx
i
  x
D
j ; where candidates' policy
positions are denoted by x
A
and x
B
, and the size of A's advantage is Æ 2 (0;
1
n 1
):
8
The game takes place in two stages. In the rst stage, candidates simultaneously
choose positions in }. In the second stage, each voter votes for the candidate whose
election would give him the higher utility. In case of indierence, a voter is assumed to
vote for each candidate with probability equal to 1=2.
9
A pure strategy equilibrium is a pair of candidate locations, (x
A
; x
D
) such that both
candidates are maximizing the probability of winning, given the choices of the other
candidate. We denote by 
A
(x
A
; x
D
) and 
D
(x
A
; x
D
) the probability of winning for
candidate A and for candidate D, respectively, as a function of (x
A
; x
D
).
10
A mixed
strategy equilibrium is a pair of probability distributions over }, (
A
; 
D
), such that
there is no mixed strategy for A that guarantees higher probability of winning than 
A
,
given 
D
and there is no mixed strategy for D that guarantees higher probability of
winning than 
D
, given 
A
.
2.1 Properties of Equilibrium
There are six main results, each of which we state without proof and provide a brief
explanation of the result.
Result 1: If n > 1, then there does not exist a pure strategy equilibrium.
There is never an equilibrium in pure strategies.
11
The intuition is simple. If the
disadvantaged candidate's location is perfectly predictable, the advantaged candidate can
copy that strategy and win for sure. Therefore, (at least) the disadvantaged candidate
must be mixing.
For the next set of results, we need two denitions.
Denition 1: A strategy for candidate j is symmetric if 
ji
= 
j;n i+1
.
Denition 2: A strategy for candidate j has no gaps if there exist integers i; k such
that 0  i  k  n and 
jt
> 0 if and only if i  t  k.
8
We refer to this as the \small advantage" case. See Aragones and Palfrey (2002) and Aragones and
Palfrey (2001) for discussion and results for the large advantage case.
9
The results do not depend on the tie-breaking rule.
10
This model is equivalent to assuming candidates maximize expected vote, with a uniform distribution
of voter ideal points.
11
Versions of this proposition, can be found in Groseclose [12] and Berger, Munger, and Pottho [5].
Ansolobehere and Snyder [2] contains some related results.
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Result 2: Generically, there exists a unique equilibrium in symmetric mixed strate-
gies with no gaps.
The possibility that there are asymmetric equilibria, or equilibria with gaps is not
ruled out.
Result 3: The distribution ofD's symmetric no-gap equilibrium strategy is U shaped.
That is, 
D
k
 
D
k+1
for 1  k <
n
2
and 
D
k
 
D
k+1
for
n
2
 k  n  1.
Result 4: The distribution of A's symmetric no-gap equilibrium strategy is single
peaked. That is, 
A
k
 
A
k+1
for 1  k <
n
2
and 
A
k
 
A
k+1
for
n
2
 k  n  1.
Result 5: Generically, the supports of the symmetric no-gap equilibrium strategies
of A and D are the same.
Result 6: The probability that A wins is greater than the probability that D wins.
Summarizing, the main results are that there exists an essentially unique equilibrium
in symmetric mixed strategies with no gaps. In this equilibrium, A is the more likely
candidate to win. That is, A's quality advantage leads to an electoral advantage. The
supports of the equilibrium mixed strategies are the same, but otherwise the two distri-
butions of the two candidates' are much dierent. The better candidate is more likely
to locate in the center of the policy space than at the extremes, while the opposite if true
for the lower quality candidate. This last property follows from results 3 and 4, and we
call it \the quality divergence eect."
2.2 The equilibrium eects of uncertainty
The results described above were derived under the assumption that the location of the
median voter is uniformly distributed on the policy space. In order to study the eect of
changes in uncertainty, we need a model which can be solved for arbitrary distributions
of the median voter. We do this by looking at a model where candidates can either
locate in the center, on the left, or on the right. While this is a simplication that does
not allow ner gradations of ideological placement of candidates, it captures the essence
of the problem, since the main dierence between the two candidates' strategies is the
frequency that they locate in the center position.
12
With three possible locations, the equilibrium has been fully solved and is given
below. Denote the three possible locations, L;C or R; to denote Left, Center, and
Right. where L < C < R. The probability the median voter is located at ideal point
in L is denoted by ; similarly the probabilities she is located at ideal points C or R
are denoted by  and  respectively, with  +  +  = 1. Suppose that the utility
12
The model can be solved for ner gradations of ideology, but little insight is gained. See Aragones
and Palfrey (2002) for a treatment of the n = 4 case.
6
functions of the voters are as the described in the previous section, and assume that
j(R   C)   (C   L)j < Æ < maxf(C   L); (R   C)g.
13
To maintain symmetry in the
problem, we assume that  =  
1
2
. Since +  +  = 1, this implies that  = 1  2,
so the model is reduced to a single parameter, , which is proportional to the variance of
the distribution. Thus, we call  the uncertainty ( or polarization) index. When  >
1
3
,
the distribution of the median voter's ideal point is bimodal. We refer to this as the
case of high uncertainty. When  <
1
3
, the distribution of the median voter's ideal point
is unimodal. We refer to this as the case of low uncertainty. The case of  =
1
3
is called
the uniform case.
Formally our model is equivalent to a model in which the population distribution of
the voter ideal points is given by (; ; ) and each candidate maximizes expect vote. In
this context,  can also be interpreted as a measure of the polarization of the electorate.
If  >
1
3
, the distribution of voters is bimodal, while if  <
1
3
, the distribution of voters
is more concentrated in the center. Because the two versions of the model yield results
that are formally equivalent, we will use the terms \uncertainty" and \polarization"
interchangeably, and both terms will refer to the level of .
Under these assumptions, the payo matrix for the game is given in Table 1 below:
a b c
a 1; 0 ; 1   1  ; 
b 1  ;  1; 0 1  ; 
c 1  ;  ; 1   1; 0
Table 1. Payo Matrix for 3 3 Game
where A is the row player and D is the column player.
The (unique) mixed equilibrium is solved in the standard way. For any mixed strategy
by D, denoted 
D
, A's expected payos for the three pure strategies are given by:

A

Lj
D

= 
D
L
+ 
D
C
+ (1  )
D
R

A

Cj
D

= (1  )
D
L
+ 
D
C
+ (1  )
D
R

A

Rj
D

= (1  )
D
L
+ ()
D
C
+ 
D
R
To solve for the mixed strategy equilibrium we equate these expected payos:

A

L; 
D

= 
A

C; 
D

=) 
D
L
  (1  )
D
C
= 0

A

C; 
D

= 
A

R; 
D

=) (1  )
D
C
  
D
R
= 0
13
That is, the quality advantage is large enough, so a C-location voter will vote for L, when the two
candidates choose opposite extremes, but small enough that voters at D
0
s location will vote for D unless
A is also located there. If the quality advantage is outside this range, the equilibria are trivial and
uninteresting.
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Thus the equilibrium value of 
D
can be determined by solving the following system of
3 equations:

D
L
  (1  )
D
C
= 0
(1  )
D
C
  
D
R
= 0

D
L
+ 
D
C
+ 
D
R
= 1
Following a similar logic, the equilibrium value of 
A
can be determined by solving a
similar system of 3 equations. This yields the following pair of equilibrium strategies

A
L
= 
A
R
=

2  
; 
A
C
=
2  3
2  

D
L
= 
D
R
=
1  
2  
; 
D
C
=

2  
To simplify notation, we denote the equilibrium by (p

; q

) where p

= 
A
C
and q

= 
D
C
,
are the equilibrium probabilities that A and D locate in the center position, respectively.
The probabilities of locating at L (or R) are therefore
1 p

2
and
1 q

2
, respectively. Using
this notation, the equilibrium is p

=
2 2
2 
and q

=

2 
.
This equilibrium solution has several interesting properties. First note that since
 
1
2
this implies that 
A
L
 
A
C
and 
D
L
 
D
C
. This is the quality divergence eect:
the advantaged candidate places more weight in the central location, and the opposite is
true for the disadvantaged candidate. This was proved only for the uniform distribution
( = 1=3) in the earlier section, but holds more generally in this 3-location model.
Second, the comparative statics with respect to the uncertainty index, , are interest-
ing and a bit surprising. First,
@p

@
< 0 so that as uncertainty increases (or the electorate
becomes more dispersed) the advantaged candidate moves away from the central location.
Surprisingly, the opposite is true for D. That is,
@q

@
> 0; implying that the disadvan-
taged candidate moves toward the center as uncertainty increases. At the extreme case,
when  =
1
2
(i.e. zero probability that the median is in the center), both candidates mix
uniformly over the three locations. In other words, both candidates tend to moderate as
the polarization index increases. We call this the \polarization hypothesis."
Finally, uncertainty benets the weaker candidate. The equilibrium probability that
D wins is given by:


D
() =
(1  )
2  
The change in this equilibrium probability as  changes is found by computing the
derivative of 

D
(), which is given by:
d

D
()
d
=
1  2
2  
+
(1  )
(2  )
2
> 0
The derivative if positive because  
1
2
.
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3 Experimental Design and Implementation
We conducted laboratory experiments using 3 dierent values of , corresponding to
three dierent levels of uncertainty. The three values were  = 1=3 (uniform),  = 1=5
(low uncertainty), and  = 3=7 (high uncertainty). The experiments used students from
California Institute of Technology (CIT) and Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF). Nine
sessions were conducted, three for each value of , of which two were carried out at CIT
and one at UPF. Table 2 summarizes the information about each session.
Uncertainty (p

; q

) # subjects UPF CIT # rounds
Uniform ( =
1
3
) (
3
5
;
1
5
) 32
Session 1 10 x 200
Session 2 8 x 200
Session 3 16 x 200
Low ( =
1
5
) (
7
9
;
1
9
) 40
Session 1 14 x 200
Session 2 10 x 200
Session 3 16 x 200
High ( =
3
7
) (
5
11
;
3
11
) 38
Session 1 8 x 166
Session 2 14 x 200
Session 3 16 x 200
Table 2. Experiment session summary
3.0.1 Procedures
The experiments were conducted using the PLDK software developed at the Hacker
Social Science Experimental Laboratory at Caltech. The interface for the software
presents each subject with a matrix of payos, and keeps track of the history of previous
game outcomes automatically for each subject. The matrices of payo were games that
are strategically equivalent to the 3-location games, but constants were added to the
payos to avoid zero outcomes and to approximately equalize the expected earnings for
A and D players. See Appendix B for the matrix of payos.
Each session lasted 200 rounds, each round being one play of the game.
14
Between
8 and 16 students participated in each session. Total earnings were equal to the sum of
all earnings over the 200 rounds. Average earnings ranged from $20 to $25 and sessions
lasted about 90 minutes.
15
Subjects played both roles (A and D). At the beginning of the session, subjects were
assigned roles as either row or column players and instructions were read aloud. The
14
The rst High session was terminated after round 166 due to a computer crash.
15
For the experiments conducted at UPF, earnings averaged 13 Euros.
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game matrix was displayed in front of the room for everyone to see. It also appeared
on their computer screen. In each round row players clicked their mouse on a row to
make a decision and column players clicked on a column to select their decision. After
everyone had made a decision, the row/column outcome of their match was highlighted
in the matrix on their screen. The screen also kept a display of the history of their play
and the choices made by their past opponents. Several practice rounds were conducted
in order to familiarize the subjects with the computer interface. During these practice
rounds, the subjects were not allowed to make any choices on their own.
The subjects then played 100 rounds, being randomly rematched into pairs (one
column player and one row player) after each round of play. After round 100, the payo
matrix was changed so that the row and column players payos were reversed. This
reversal was carefully explained to the subjects. They played 100 additional times with
these reversed payos. This reversal allowed each subject to have 100 rounds of experience
as the A player and 100 rounds of experience as the D player. Subjects were told all of
this information in advance. The instructions were worded in neutral terms that would
not be associated with personal political ideology. The three strategies were labeled \A,
B, C". A sample copy of the instructions is attached as an appendix to this paper.
3.0.2 Hypotheses
We have the following comparative static hypotheses that are derived from the theory.
These are summarized below, denoting the empirical choice frequencies of center by (
b
p;
b
q),
and the treatments by H;M;L (for High, Medium, or Low uncertainty)
1.
b
p
L
>
b
p
M
>
b
p
H
2.
b
q
L
<
b
q
M
<
b
q
H
3.
b
q <
1
3
<
b
p for all uncertainty treatments
These hypotheses can be summarized in one string of inequalities:
b
q
L
<
b
q
M
<
b
q
H
<
1
3
<
b
p
H
<
b
p
M
<
b
p
L
4 Experimental Results
4.1 Eect of uncertainty on location decisions
The main results of the paper have to do with the eect of the primary treatment variable
(level of uncertainty) on the location decisions of the subject candidates. Recall that
there are four primary hypotheses based on the Nash equilibrium model presented in the
previous section. The rst hypothesis states that disadvantaged candidates will choose
10
the center location less than one-third of the time, regardless of the level of uncertainty.
The second hypothesis states that advantaged candidates will choose the center location
more than one-third of the time, regardless of the level of uncertainty. Thus hypotheses
1 and 2 jointly imply the quality divergence hypothesis. The third hypothesis states
that disadvantaged candidates will choose the center location more often as the level
of uncertainty increases. The fourth hypothesis states that advantaged candidates will
choose the center location less often as the level of uncertainty increases. Thus hypotheses
3 and 4 jointly imply the polarization hypothesis. Table 3 compares the theoretically
predicted center choice probabilities the aggregate relative choice frequencies by subjects
when they were candidates A and D for each of the three treatments.
Uncertainty p

q

b
p
b
q
Uniform .6 .2 .609 .288
N 3200 3200
Low .78 .11 .769 .252
N 4000 4000
High .45 .27 .514 .320
N 3664 3664
Table 3. Nash predictions and
Aggregate Date
The key observation from this table is that all four of the main hypotheses of the
theory are strongly supported by the aggregate data from this experiment. The order
of center choice relative frequencies,
b
q
L
<
b
q
M
<
b
q
H
<
1
3
<
b
p
H
<
b
p
M
<
b
p
L
, is exactly
what is predicted by Nash equilibrium. Table 4 clearly shows the support for all of these
theoretical hypotheses. That table displays the dierences between pairs of aggregate
choice frequencies. The cell entries in the table correspond to the dierence is the
relative frequency of center choices for two treatments (or one treatment compared with
1
3
). For example, the entry in the cell with row label
b
p
L
and column label
b
p
M
is
b
p
L
 
b
p
M
=
:769  :609 = :160. Every single one of the 21 predicted dierences have the correct sign,
and all except one are statistically signicant at better than the 1% level.
11
bp
L
b
p
M
b
p
H
1
3
b
q
H
b
q
M
b
q
L
b
p
L
:160

:255

:436

:449

:481

:517

b
p
M
:095

:276

:289

:321

:357

b
p
H
  :181

:194

:226

:262

1
3
  :013

:045

:081

b
q
H
  :032

:068

b
q
M
  :036

b
q
L
 
Table 4. The entries in each cell correspond to the dierrence
between row and column in relative frequency of choosing Center.

signicant at better than 1% level.

signicant at better than 5% level.
With the exception of the bimodal treatment, the aggregate t for the A players to
the quantitative prediction of Nash equilibrium was nearly perfect. The quantitative t
for the D players is not nearly as good, and the error was in the direction of overplaying
the center strategy in all cases. The A players overplayed the center strategy in 2 of 3
treatments (the exception being the High treatment, where the dierence is very small.)
In addition, the D players do not respond very strongly to the treatment eects. That
is, the dierences between
b
q in the dierent treatments was always less than predicted
by the theory. Thus, while the qualitative features of the data are very supportive of the
theory, the actual magnitudes of (
b
p;
b
q) in the various treatments deviate somewhat from
the Nash equilibrium predictions in systematic ways. This can be seen clearly in Figure
1, which displays the Nash predictions and the relative frequencies from the aggregate
data, by treatment. In that gure, p is on the horizontal axis and q is on the vertical
axis.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
To summarize, there are ve main features of the aggregate data:
1. The quality divergence hypothesis is strongly supported by the data.
2. The polarization hypothesis is strongly supported by the data.
3. All of the signed comparative static predictions about p and q were strongly sup-
ported by the data.
4. All of these comparative static dierences are statistically signicant.
5. The A player ts the Nash predictions much better than the D player.
6. Both players tend to overplay the center strategy, and this eect is strongest for
the D players.
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7. The response of the D players to changes in the level of uncertainty is less than
predicted.
4.2 Quantal Response Equilibrium Analysis
The strategic structure of equilibrium suggests the following possible explanation. If
D players begin with uninformative prior beliefs about the choices by A players, then
locating in the center is their optimal choice. The same is true for the A players. This
could produce a pattern in which both players initially overplay C, and then gradually
adapt in the direction of their equilibrium strategy. Since in this kind of process D
starts out further away from his equilibrium strategy than A, it is not surprising that A
frequencies are closer to their equilibrium values than the D frequencies. What is needed
to capture this idea theoretically is a model that can predict one player to be further
from Nash equilibrium than the other player.
Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) is an equilibrium model of imperfect play. A
quantal response function is simply a smoothed out single-valued best response function
that is monotonically increasing in expected payos. The quantal response functions
are continuous and \statistical" in the sense that all strategies are played with posi-
tive probability. Therefore, players do not always play best responses. However, the
monotone property implies that they play better strategies more frequently than worse
strategies. Formally, for each player, the quantal response function maps the vector of
expected payos of feasible actions into mixed strategy, that satises monotonicity and
continuity properties. A quantal response equilibrium is a xed point of the following
composed mapping. Let  be some (mixed) strategy prole in the game. Given , one
can compute, for each player i and for each of player i's possible actions j, the expected
payo from playing that action, given , denoted U
ij
. Given these vectors of expected
payos, the quantal response functions of players then yield a new mixed strategy prole,
b
 = QR(). A QRE is a xed point of this mapping, that is, a mixed strategy prole, 

,
with the property that 

= QR(

). McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) establish a number of
theoretical properties of QRE points, including existence and upper hemicontinuity and
a connection between QRE and Bayesian equilibrium of games with payo disurbances.
A particularly useful parametric form of QRE is the Logit equilibrium. The Logit
equilibrium arises when all players' quantal response functions are Logit functions of the
expected utilities that are implied by the mixed strategies. Formally, a Logit quantal
response function is given by:
b

ij
=
e
U
ij
()
P
k
e
U
ik
()
where  is a parameter measuring the responsiveness of i to payo dierences between
strategies. A Logit equilibrium is therefore a mixed strategy prole 

such that


ij
=
e
U
ij
(

)
P
k
e
U
ik
(

)
for all i and j
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When  = 0, behavior is completely unpredictable, and the unique Logit equilibrium has
every player choosing actions according to a uniform distribution. When  ! 1, the
Logit equilibria converge to Nash equilibria. The Logit equilibrium correspondence for
a game is the set of all Logit equilibria for the game, for all non-negative values of .
Because of it's relatively simple functional form, Logit equilibria are relatively easy to
compute numerically, and in some cases analytically.
Figures 2, 3, and 4 graph the Logit equilibrium correspondences for the H, M, and
L treatments, respectively. Choice probabilities are on the vertical axis and  is on the
horizontal axis. For simplicity, we only include the choice frequencies for C locations,
one for each of the two players. Thus, each graph has two curves, one for the A player
and one for the D player. From the graphs, one can easily see how the QRE captures the
intuition that the A players converge more quickly to the Nash equilibrium, while the D
players converge slowly. Neither converges monotonically. For intermediate values of ,
both players overplay C relative to Nash equilibrium.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
The Logit equilibrium correspondence also provides a structural model that permits
us to t the data to QRE using standard maximum likelihood techniques. Given a dataset
consisting of n observations of A and D choices in the location game, one can construct
the likelihood function as a function of the free parameter, , which is determined by
the theoretical choice probabilities of the unique Logit equilibrium for that value of .
The maximum likelihood estimate of  is the value of  at which that likelihood function
is maximized. This parameter estimate in turn implies estimated equilibrium choice
frequencies, (
b
p

;
b
q

) using the formula above.
Figure 5 is similar to gure 1, but also includes the tted QRE-predicted choice
probabilities of A and D, in addition to the Nash predictions and the aggregate data.
The QRE model clearly picks up the three anomalous features of the data: overplay
of Center by both players, and the worse t of D compared to A, and the weaker
responsiveness by D to changes in uncertainty.
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
Table 5 presents the QRE estimates of the data broken down by treatment and model.
Column one lists the three treatements, Uniform, Low, and High. We computed estimates
for three dierent models, which we call the unconstrained model, the constrained model,
and the Nash model, respectively. The unconstrained estimates allow a separate estimate
of  for each treatment, while the constrained estimate forces
b
 to be the same for all
treatments. The Nash model computes the likelihood function using the Nash equilibrium
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Treatment Model bp

bq

p q
b
 -logL 
2
statistic
Uniform unconstrained .616 .289 .609 .288 1.04 6510
constrained .618 .266 1.43 6515 8.70

Nash model .600 .200 1 6580 140

Low Uncertainty unconstrained .803 .261 .769 .252 1.55 7150
constrained .800 .272 1.43 7151 2.66
+
Nash model .778 .111 1 7441 582

High Uncertainty unconstrained .462 .312 .514 .320 1.22 7817
constrained .462 .306 1.43 7817 0.92
+
Nash model .455 .273 1 7839 44

Table 5. QRE estimation results and tests of constrained models.

Model restriction rejected at 1% signicance level or better.
+
Model restriction cannot be rejected at 10% signicance level.
choice probabilities, which correpond to the limit of the QRE choice probabilities when
!1.
Columns 3 and 4 give (
b
p

;
b
q

), the estimated choice probabilities under the various
models. Columns 5 and 6 give (p; q), the empirical relative frequencies observed in the
experiment. Column 7 gives the maximum likelihood estimate of ; and column 8 gives
minus the value of the log likelihood function for the model, evaluated at the maximum
likelihood estimate of .
The constrained model is nested in the unconstrained model, so we use a likelihood
ratio test to test for model rejection. The chi-square statistic (twice the log of the
likelihood ratio), is given in the last column of table 5. While the unconstrained model ts
slightly better in all three cases, the improvement in t is insignicant (at the 10% level)
for two of the treatments (Bimodal and Unimodal). Only with the Uniform treatment
it is statistically signicant (at the 1% level), but even for this case, the improvment in
t is of little real consequence, as the implied dierences for choice probabilities between
the two models are negligible.
The Nash equilibrium model is also (approximately) nested in the unconstrained
model, so we can again use a likelihood ratio test to test for model rejection. The Nash
model is easily rejected for all treatments, and the dierences are statistically signicant
at any conventional level.
We next turn to the secondary hypotheses of the experiment, concerning experience
and heterogeneity.
4.3 Experience and Learning
We investigate learning at a macro scale, simply asking whether aggregate behavior was
dierent after subjects had a chance to observe the pattern of behavior of their opponents.
Recall that our design used randommatching, so that subjects were not trying to outguess
an opponent based on observation of that opponent's play. Instead, the subjects were
receiving information about he average play of the population over time. For this reason,
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we focus out attention in this subsection on changes of average play over the course of a
session.
We divide the data into two data subsets, one which we call experienced and the
other which we call inexperienced. Since subjects played 100 rounds in each candidate's
role, we dene inexperienced rounds to be the rst 50 rounds a subject was in a particular
round and dene experienced rounds to be the remaining 50 rounds a subject was in that
role.
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There were clear and signicant trends in the data, with the experienced data
being closer to Nash equilibrium and also tting the QRE model better. Also, in all
cases the estimate of
b
 increases with experience, and the changes are signicant at the
1% level or better. However, in most cases, the actual movement in the aggregate choice
probabilities was not very large. Table 6 displays the estimates broken down separately
by treatment and by experience level. Figure 6 displays the dierences in a graph similar
to gure 5.
b
p

b
q

p q
b
   logL
Uniform inexperienced .611 .307 .623 .307 .856 3257
experienced .618 .270 .594 .269 1.35 3251
Low Uncertainty inexperienced .800 .270 .763 .260 1.46 3605
experienced .804 .251 .775 .245 1.68 3544
High Uncertainty inexperienced .461 .315 .516 .324 1.15 4051
experienced

.462 .310 .512 .315 1.32 3765
Table 6. QRE estimates (
b
p

;
b
q

) of the aggregate data (p; q)

272 fewer observations than previous row
FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE
4.4 Heterogeneity
This section examines variation in choice behavior across subjects. We nd evidence for
heterogeneity. Even with the heterogeneity, all of the comparative statics results are still
supported in the data. This is important to note because the statistical tests in the earlier
section assume that all observations are independent, and therefore the signicance levels
are inated. One way to adjust for this is to conduct similar tests with the individual level
data, comparing the population distribution of choice probabilities across samples, using
non-parametric statistics. This is what we do here, with the pooled sample of individuals.
Figure 7 shows the cumulative distributions of individual choice frequencies by treatment
and by role. For example, in the uniform treatment, there were 32 subjects, so the graph
shows 32 center choice frequencies for the individuals when they were A players and 32
choice frequencies for the same individuals when they were D players. Each point on the
graph gives the relative frequency (out of 100 moves) that a particular individual chose
the center strategy in a particular rule. The points are ordered by relative frequency
16
In the case of the experiment that crashed, we lost 34 rounds of experienced data.
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(not subject), so that the curves represent empirical cumulative distribution functions
of individual choice frequencies. There is a clear ordering of these empirical CDF's, as
hypothesized.
FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE
FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE
A second issue with heterogeneity arises because we used two separate subject pools.
This feature of the design was implemented as a robustness check. The student popula-
tions (and culture) at UPF and CIT are dierent in many ways, but the theoretical model
is intended to apply to both subject pools, so we do not predict a dierence. Figure 8
displays the UPF and CIT data as well as the Nash predictions and the QRE estimates.
FIGURE 9 ABOUT HERE
Indeed the behavior in the two subject pools is very similar, in spite of some small
quantitative dierences. There is one reversal of the sign predictions, which occurs in the
CIT data. That reversal is
b
q
L;CIT
>
b
q
M;CIT
, but the dierence ( :016) is not signicant
at the 5% level.
5 Conclusions
The results of this laboratory experiment provide strong support for the theoretical equi-
librium eects of candidate quality on policy location. The central predictions of the
theory are the quality divergence hypothesis and the polarization hypothesis. That is:
1) both candidates diverge from the center, with the weaker candidate diverging more
than the stronger candidate; and 2) as the distribution of voters becomes more spread
out, both candidates moderate their positions. The design allowed us to test these key
predictions about how endogenous variables (candidate locations ) co-vary with candi-
date quality, and with the distribution of voters. All of these predictions were supported
by the data. Altogther, the design and the model oer 21 predicted sign dierences in
the observable choice frequencies by the candidates, across the three treatments. Every
single one of these 21 predicted sign dierences were the right sign and were statistically
signicant.
The quantitative predictions of the theory were also the right order of magnitude, but
there were two interesting biases that were observed. First, we found that when subjects
were in the role of the advantaged candidate were more responsive to the changes in the
distribution of voters than when they were in the role of the disadvantaged candidate. As
a result the Nash equilibrium predictions t the data for advantaged candidates better
than the data for the disadvantaged candidates. Second both players tend to adopt
17
more moderate positions than was predicted by the model. We show that both of these
observations can be accounted for very well by a bounded rationality version of Nash
equilibrium, called Quantal Response Equilibrium.
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7 Appendix: Sample Instructions
7.1 Introduction
Welcome to the SSEL Lab. Please do not do anything with the computer equipment
until you are instructed to. Please put all of your personal belongings away, so we can
have your complete attention. Raise your hand if you need a pencil. Feel free to adjust
your chairs so they are comfortable for you.
This is an experiment in decision making, and you will be paid for your participation
in cash, at the end of the experiment. Dierent subjects may earn dierent amounts.
What you earn depends partly on your decisions and partly on the decisions of others.
The entire experiment will take place through computer terminals, and all interaction
between you will take place through the computers. It is important that you not talk or
in any way try to communicate with other subjects during the experiment.
We will start with a brief instruction period. During this instruction period, you will
be given a complete description of the experiment and will be shown how to use the
computers. If you have any questions during the instruction period, raise your hand and
your question will be answered so everyone can hear.
7.2 Computer Instructions and Practice Matches
During the computer instruction session, we will teach you how to use the computer by
going through a practice session. We will go through this practice session very slowly
and it is important that you follow instructions exactly. Do not hit any keys until you
are told to do so, and when you are told to enter information, type exactly what you are
told to type. You are not paid for the practice session.
We will rst pass out the practice experiment record sheet, on which you will record
all of the results from this experiment. Please record your name, the date, and your
social security number on the bottom of the sheet. Note that you have been assigned a
color, either Red or Blue. The color is written on top of the record sheet.
[PASS OUT RECORD SHEETS]
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO RECORD INFORMATION]
START PLDK SERVER PROGRAM ON SERVER, IF NOT DONE ALREADY]
Please click on the ICON that says "PLDK client." When the computer prompts you
for your name, type your full name, your social security number, and click on your color.
Then click OK to conrm. If you have any questions about how to do this, please raise
your hand.
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO LOG ON]
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You now see the experiment screen. You have each been assigned to be either a RED
subject or a BLUE subject in this experiment. Your color as well as your subject ID
number is shown in the banner at the top of the screen. Please record your subject ID
number on your record sheet.
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO RECORD INFORMATION]
Each of you has been matched by the computer with a subject of the opposite color.
If you are a BLUE subject, you are matched with one of the other RED subjects. If you
are a RED subject, you are matched with one of the BLUE subject.
In the upper left part of the screen, you see a table.
[SHOW TABLE ON OVERHEAD PROJECTOR]
Will all subjects now move the mouse into the table and click it. If you are a RED
subject, one of the rows will be highlighted. If you are a BLUE subject, one of the
columns will be highlighted.
Each of you is asked to make a choice, but please do not do so at this time. If you
are a RED subject, on the left of the screen you are asked to please choose a row. If you
are a BLUE subject, you are asked to please choose a column. The outcome, and your
payo, is determined by the cell in the table that is chosen. In each cell of the table, the
rst number is the payo for the RED subject, and the second number is the payo to
the BLUE subject.
[GO THROUGH A COUPLE CELLS IN OVERHEAD TABLE TO EXPLAIN]
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO HIGHLIGHT ROW OR COLUMN]
Will all RED subjects now please choose \B" and all BLUE subjects please choose
\A" by clicking the mouse button now while the arrow is pointing to the appropriate
row or column. After you have made your choice, you are given a chance to conrm
your decision. If it is not correct, please change it. When it is correct, please conrm by
clicking on \conrm" now.
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO CHOOSE AND CONFIRM CHOICE]
[WALK AROUND ROOM TO CHECK]
After all subjects have conrmed their choices, the match is over and you are shown
the choice of the blue subject you were matched with. The outcome of the round, BA, is
now highlighted in purple on everybody's screen. Your earnings are determined by the
entries in the highlighted cell of the table that was selected. So the payo to a RED
subject for the rst match is 6 points and the payo to a BLUE subject is 14 points.
You are not being paid for the practice session, but if this were the real experiment, then
the payo you have recorded would be money you have earned from the rst match, in
points.
We will now proceed to the second practice match. Each match is the same except
you are matched with a new subject of the opposite color. Note that the decisions and
payos of the rst match are recorded in the experiment history at the right side of the
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screen. The outcomes of all of the previous matches will be recorded at the right side
of the screen throughout the experiment so that you can refer back to previous rounds
whenever you like.
[HIT KEY TO START SECOND ROUND]
For the second match, each of you have now been rematched with a new subject of
the opposite color. All RED subjects again choose \B" and conrm. All BLUE subjects
choose \C" by clicking on the right column.
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO CHOOSE AND CONFIRM CHOICE]
The payo to a RED subject for this practice round is 8 points and the payo to a
BLUE subject is 12 points. This concludes the second round. Notice that the results
are again recorded in the history screen. Note also that the history screen keeps track of
the number of times you have chosen each row or column, and of the average payo you
received from each row or column. For example, the red subject has chosen \A" twice.
The rst time she received 6, and the second time 8 points. So the average is 7.
[DO 4 MORE ROUNDS, CHOOSING (BA), (CC), (BB), (CA)]
.
[HIT KEY TO END PRACTICE SESSION]
This concludes the practice session. The computer screen now indicates your total
points that you earned in the practice session. This is multiplied by the exchange rate
to get your money Payo. Since this is a practice session, the exchange rate is zero. In
the actual experiment, the exchange rate is :01, so that each point is worth one cent.
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO RECORD OUTCOME AND CLICK "OK"]
7.3 Part 1
The actual experiment consists of two parts. Each part will last for 100 matches. When
the rst part is over, we will give you some additional instructions before the second
part begins. Each match will proceed as in the rst practice match, except you will be
paid one cent for each point. The table will have three rows and three columns, the row
and column labels will be the same as the practice, and the payos in the table will be
the same as in the practice. Also, just like in the practice round, you will be randomly
rematched with a new subject of the opposite color after each match.
The total amount you earn in this rst part of the experiment is equal to the sum of
your earnings in all 100 matches. You will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment.
No other participant will be told how much money you earned in the experiment. You
need not tell any other participants how much you earned. Are there any questions before
we begin the experiment?
[TAKE QUESTIONS]
O.K., then we will now begin with the actual experiment.
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Please lower your chairs to the lowest position, and pull out the dividers as far as
they will go. This ensures your privacy and the privacy of the others in the experiment.
We will now begin match number 1.
[START EXPERIMENT]
[AFTER FIRST MATCH ANNOUNCE:]
The rst real match of the experiment is over. There will be 99 more matches in Part
1. Remember that you are randomly rematched with a new subject after every single
match. After match 100 has nished, please record your total payos on your record
sheet and then wait for the instructions for the second part of the experiment.
7.4 Part 2
This is the second and nal part of the experiment. The amount of money you earn
in this part will be added to the amount you earned in part 1 to determine your total
money earnings for the whole experiment. Just as in part 1, each point is worth one cent.
This part of the experiment is similar to the rst part, except the payo table has been
changed in a very specic way.
[SHOW NEW TABLE ON OVERHEAD PROJECTOR NEXT TO OLD TABLE]
This is a payo table that reverses the roles of Blue and Red. That is, Blue's payos
are the same as Reds payos were in Part 1, and Red's payos are the same as Blue's
payos were in Part 1. For example, suppose that Blue chooses A and Red chooses B.
Then Blue gets 6 and Red gets 14. Now compare this to the payos in the rst table,
when Red chose A and Blue chose B.
[PUT UP COMBINED SLIDE WITH BOTH PAYOFFS]
Then Red got 6 and Blue got 14. If you look carefully at the new table, you will
notice that it is derived from the old one by transposing it (that is, ipping it around
the diagonal) and reversing the Red and Blue payos.
[ILLUSTRATE HOW THIS TRANSPOSITION WORKS USING OVERHEADS]
Are there any questions before we begin?
[TAKE QUESTIONS]
O.K., then we will now begin the second part. The second part will also have 100
matches. Remember that you are randomly rematched with a new subject after every
single match. After match 100 has nished, please record your Part 2 total payos on
your record sheet and then wait for instructions for how to be paid. We ask you to refrain
from talking with each other, not only during the matches, but also while you are waiting
to be paid. Thank you in advance for your cooperation.
[BEGIN SECOND PART]
[END AFTER MATCH 100]
The experiment is now over. Please record your part 2 money earnings and add them
24
to your part 1 money earnings. Enter this sum in the row labeled Total Earnings. You
will be paid this amount of money in the next room. We will pay you one at a time,
beginning with subject number 1. We ask you not to talk with each other or use the
computer equipment while you are waiting to be paid. Subject number 1, will you please
come with us to the next room. Please collect your belongings and bring them and your
record sheet with you. You will be leaving from the outside door in the next room.
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Figure 1. Experiment Data and Nash Predictions
Figure 2. Logit correspondence for Uniform treatment
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Figure 3. Logit correspondence for Low treatment
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Figure 4. Logit correspondence for High treatment
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Figure 5. QRE estimates and the data.
Figure 6. QRE estimates and the data. The effect of experience
Experience effects
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Figure 7. Choice frequencies. Individual level data.
Individual data: Uniform Voter Distribution
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Individual data: Bimodal Voter Distribution
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Individual data: Unimodal Voter Distribution
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Figure 8. CDF’s of Individual Choice frequencies.
Individual data: D candidates
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Individual data: A candidates
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Figure 9. Choice frequencies. UPF vs. CIT.
Comparison of CIT and UPF data
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